Consider agents who undertake costly e¤ort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is su¢ cient diversity in agents' skills relative to the noise on output, then the proportional prize will, in a precise sense, elicit more output on average, than the deterministic prize. Indeed, assuming agents know each others' skills (the complete information case), this result holds when any Nash equilibrium selection, under the proportional prize, is compared with any individually rational selection under the deterministic prize. When there is incomplete information, the result is still true but now we must restrict to Nash selections for both prizes.
Introduction
Consider agents who undertake costly e¤ort to produce stochastic outputs that are observable, and valued, by a principal. The principal, in exchange, has 1 a "pot of gold"that is valued by the agents. The question is: how should the principal award the gold in order to elicit maximal expected output from the agents? Should he give the entire pot to the best performer? Or should he a priori divide the pot into k parts and award these as 1 st ; 2 nd ; :::; k th prizes to the agents, based upon the rank-order of their outputs? Or is there something else the principal can do?
We propose the following simple scheme. Let the principal "market"the gold to the agents on the understanding that they must pay for it with the output they have produced. How the gold gets allocated is then left to market forces. Indeed, suppose that agents 1; :::; n have put up supplies of x 1 ; :::; x n units of output; and that the principal has put up y units of gold on the other side of the market. The only price p, of the output in terms of gold, which will "clear" the market is 2 p = y=(x 1 + +x n ), and this is tantamount to handing out the gold y to the agents in proportion to the quantities they have put up 3 . Note that this scheme also makes sense when the pot is indivisible. In this event, what is being marketed is the probability of winning the whole pot y. We shall indeed couch our analysis in terms of the indivisible prize rather than the divisible pot of gold (the two are isomorphic). And, for this reason, when the entire pot goes to the highest output, we shall refer to it as the "deterministic scheme/prize", though it is deterministic only in the outputs, and not necessarily in the e¤ort undertaken by the contestants, since output may be a random function of e¤ort.
We …rst compare the proportional (marketed) prize P to the deteministic prize D , which in turn is often better than multiple a priori …xed prizes. (see (23) , and also subsection 7.3). Our main result here is that, if there is su¢ cient diversity in agents'characteristics, then -in a sense about to be made precise -the proportional prize elicits more expected total output from the agents than the deterministic prize.
What is essential for our analysis is that agents' performance be susceptible to quanti…cation in terms of some tangible output produced or, more generally, a "score". This often obtains in practice. For instance, a manager can consider total revenue earned as the criterion to award a badge of honor, or promotion to a higher 1 To borrow the vision from (23) 2 the total demand for gold is px 1 + + px n which must equal the supply y 3 To continue the propaganda, the proportional scheme is the only one which is non-manipulable in the following sense: if an agent pretends to be several agents by splitting his output to be sent out in di¤erent names, this can be of no bene…t to him; nor can several agents bene…t by merging their outputs and pretending to be one agent (see M.A.de Frutos (1999)).
echelon, to the best salesman of the year. In a race, the time taken for completion comes naturally to mind. Sometimes scores are of a more subtle structure: in a gymnastics contest each member of a jury gives subjective scores to di¤erent aspects of performance which are then aggregated to come up with …nal scores. (The reader can no doubt think of many other examples.) One upshot of assigning numerical scores, and perhaps the reason why they are so prevalent, is that they enable us to judge not only who beat whom, but by how much. Was the race keenly contested or one-sided? What was the margin of victory? These are questions that are often not without meaning, and amenable to plausible answers, which is re ‡ected in the way scores get de…ned in practice.
Turning to prizes based on scores, the use of the deterministic prize D is an established tradition, and it has been well studied by economic theorists (see the literature survey in subsection 1.1 below). However, in principle, the prize could be given with di¤erent probabilities to the contestants based upon the scores that they achieve, opening up for consideration a wide class of schemes (see section 9) , of which D is but one. The proportional prize P , which we …rst focus on and juxtapose with D , is equivalent to putting up "lottery tickets" at the market, which the contestants can "buy" with their scores. The use of lotteries to award prizes is also extremely widespread, but it has not received much attention from theorists, except in the context of lobbying (see, again, Section 1.1).
The proportional scheme P is our proxy for awarding the prize in a manner that is less drastic than the deterministic D , and more commensurate with performance. Any scheme close to P (in the bounded variation norm) will inherit its properties. So, for our purposes, the precision with which probabilities of winning the prize are de…ned does not really matter, so long as they do not stray too far from proportionality; and, in the same vein, minor di¤erences in the delineation of the scores do not disturb our conclusions (see subsection 7.2.) Needless to say, if performances are incapable of being sensibly quanti…ed by scores, and can only be ranked, then the proportional scheme has no meaning and only ordinal schemes (i.e., D and its variants with multiple deterministic prizes) make sense. (For an excellent treatment of the ordinal case, see (23) .) In our model here, as in much of the literature, the principal is presumed to be maximizing the total score (output) of all the agents, so a fortiori he can observe the individual scores that make up the total. It is not so much a matter of observability, but that the cost of observation is small enough to be ignored. This assumption underlies our analysis.
We further assume that outputs are all that the principal can observe. He does not have knowledge of agents'characteristics (i.e., productive skill, cost of e¤ort, valuation of the prize), nor even of their precise population distribution. Our purpose is to design a robust scheme, based on observable outputs alone 4 , which does well over a wide range of possible distributions. Both the deterministic and the proportional schemes are robust but, as was said, the proportional scheme inspires better performance when there is diversity of skills.
The intuition for this result is simple and best brought out with two agents who have complete information about each other's characteristics. (We show, in section 8, that our results are not marred when there is incomplete information, i.e., each agent is informed only of his own characteristics and has a probability distribution over those of his rivals.) Suppose the deterministic prize D is in use and that the two agents' skills are su¢ ciently disparate so that the weak cannot produce more than the strong, with any signi…cant probability, even if he works hard and the other slackens. Since e¤ort is costly, the upshot is an equilibrium at which both agents undertake low e¤ort, so that total output is also low. In contrast, the proportional prize P generates better incentives to work. By increasing e¤ort and producing more output, the weak agent is able to achieve a decent increment in his probability of winning the prize, even when his output always lags behind his rival's. Therefore he is inspired to work and creates the competition which also spurs his rival to work, culminating in an equilibrium where e¤ort and output are high. That an egalitarian scheme, which distributes rewards commensurate with output produced, will often generate better incentives to work than an elitist scheme in which the rewards are reserved for the top few -this, in our view, is a theme of wide-ranging application in the presence of heterogeneous agents, and it runs like a leitmotif in the design of mechanisms in di¤erent contexts (see, e.g., (14) , (13) , (12) ).
On the other hand, when skills are similar (think of athletic stars competing in the Olympics), D will clearly elicit more e¤ort than P . For if both work, they come out with nearly equal probabilities of winning the prize under either scheme. But if anyone slackens, his probability drops sharply under D , and less so under P . Thus there is more to lose by slackening when D is in use. Now if agents'skills are picked at random from a su¢ ciently "diverse" set, and the noise on output is not so large as to overwhelm skills and make them count for little, then the probability that agents are similar will tend to be low. Therefore the average output will go up when P replaces D . In fact we show that this is 4 It is also desirable that the scheme be simple, which is a "feel" one gets about both D and P . The restriction to schemes that are based on outputs alone, does help to put a lid on their "complexity" (though we do not have a formal de…nition of this notion). Otherwise in general, appealing to the "revelation principle", one could require agents to report their characteristics and base the allocation of the prize on these reports, truthful or not. But the authors could not see tractable schemes in this direction.
the case when any Nash Equilibrium (NE) selection under P is compared with any individually rational (IR) selection under D . Furthermore, when P replaces D , an impoverished majority of non-elite agents, who were idle before but are now incentivized to work, are made better o¤ at the expense of the elite coterie (see subsection 7.1). Were the principal to ask for a vote, P would win with a thumping majority over D . And indeed why would he not ask, seeing that P elicits so much more output for him?
In Section 8, we show that our theme remains intact when there is incomplete information among the agents: the NE-selection under P elicits more output compared to the NE-selection under D , as long as the noise on output is not too large compared to the diversity of agents' skills. (We write "the NE" because, in the more structured binary games that we examine in Section 8, NE's do turn out to be unique.)
So far the scheme ( P or D ) was taken to be …xed and the behavior (NE or IR) induced by it was examined. In Section 9, we adopt the reverse approach: behavior is …xed at maximal e¤ort and our focus is on schemes that implement it 5 as NE. More precisely, we consider a natural class of probabilistic schemes for handing out the prize, which includes the deterministic and proportional schemes as special cases. Then, …xing an arbitrary domain of agents'characteristics, for each scheme there is a threshold (possibly in…nity) such that the scheme will implement maximal e¤ort as an NE on the domain if, and only if, the value of the prize exceeds the threshold. Thus schemes may be ranked via their thresholds, and the one with the smallest threshold will be optimal: it will Nash-implement maximal e¤ort whenever any other scheme does so 6 . There is clearly no problem regarding the existence of such an optimal -or, at least, nearly optimal -scheme. The challenge is to uncover its structure. We do so for two special domains. The …rst is a binary set-up with two agents and two e¤ort levels (low, high), in which agents'skills can be ordered so as to exhibit "decreasing, or increasing, returns". The optimal scheme turns out to be a monotonic step function, whose graph lies in between those of the proportional and the deterministic schemes. Next we analyse the binary model with the added proviso that agents'base skills are so strong (think again of champions, or stars, or experts) that the percentage gain in output, when an agent switches from low to high e¤ort, is small (even though, on the absolute scale, these gains may be substantial enough to enable meaningful comparisons between the two agents). In this scenario we show that the optimal scheme awards the prize according to the "log of the odds", with odds based upon the proportional scheme. Moreover the optimal scheme does not depend on the distribution of skills of the agents, except insofar as they exhibit decreasing or increasing returns.
Finally let us note that this paper is self-contained but, to round o¤ the perspective, we shall often allude to its expanded version (11) , which contains several variants and extensions of the results described here. (A precursor to this paper is (10).)
Related Literature. There is a literature on lobbying, where agents put up bids of money and are awarded the prize either via the proportional scheme or the deterministic scheme (called often "lottery" or "all-pay auctions", respectively). See, e.g., (29) , (20) , (15), (27) , (28), (3), (4), (8), (9), (25) , (16) and the references therein. In much of this literature agents are assumed to have complete information about each other, and in all of it there is no issue of "moral hazard", i.e., the bids submitted by the agents are perfectly observable.
The literature on tournaments is vast and does often emphasize moral hazard, i.e., the setting in which observable outputs depend stochastically on unobservable e¤ort ("bids"). However proportional prizes do not seem to have received attention there. For tournaments with a single prize, see (22) , (19) , (24), (26) . Subsequent writers have considered multiple prizes whose number and sizes are …xed prior to the contest, and which are then awarded to the contestants based upon the rank-order of their performance ((18),(5),(1),(7),(21),(6), (2) , (23)).
In both strands of literature the focus is on analyzing Nash Equilibria (NE), which are often unique and susceptible of being described by explicit formulae, given the special structural assumptions of the models.
What is new in our approach is that we compare the proportional and deterministic prizes in the presence of moral hazard. Our setting is su¢ ciently general so as to neither preclude multiple NE, nor guarantee pure-strategy NE. No assumptions are made on disutility or productivity other than the fact that they are monotonic in e¤ort in the appropriate sense; in particular they are not required to be concave or convex. Nevertheless we are able to show that the worst NE selection under the proportional prize elicits more output than the best NE under the deterministic prize. In fact we show more, since our comparison is based on "Weak Nash Strategies" (see subsection 5.1) and IR strategies, which are looser notions than NE (indeed IR is so mild a reqirement that any solution concept would be expected to satisfy it). To the extent that this constrains agents' behavior less, our comparison is that much stronger (more credible?). Of course, the price we pay for our generality is that we stop at this comparison, and are unable to discern any …ner structure in agents'behavior, which would come to the fore were one to con…ne attention to NE, especially in simple scenarios where they are unique (as happens in some of the structured examples we study here in section 8, or in (11)).
The Numbering System. All de…nitions, axioms, lemmas, theorems are taken to constitute a single series, and enumerated in the order they …rst appear. Thus the reader will see, starting in the next section, Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Theorem 3, Axiom 4, Lemma 5 etc. Here Lemma 5 does not mean the "…fth" lemma, but the lemma whose "name" (or "marker") in the series is 5.
The Model
Each agent in our model has access to a …nite subset E [0; 1] of e¤ort levels. We assume 0 2 E and 1 2 E. These represent no e¤ort and maximal e¤ort respectively.
An agent may choose any e¤ort x 2 E. In doing so, he incurs disutility (x) 0 and produces stochastic output given by a non-negative random variable (x) with …nite mean (x). (We allow for the possibility that the range of (x) is discrete, even …nite.) E¤ort 0 incurs disutility (0) = 0 and produces output (0) = 0 with certainty: it is just a proxy for "not participating"in the game.
Agents are driven to work by the lure of an indivisible prize, which is handed out to them by a prinicpal. If an agent places valuation v > 0 on the prize, and is awarded it with probability p, this yields him expected utility pv. (See, however, the subsection 7.2, where it is shown that the tenor of our results remains unchanged for a wider class of utilities.)
The triple ( ; ; v) characterizes an agent. We make throughout the following monotonicity and boundedness assumptions on the space 7 X of possible characteristics ( ; ; v): Axiom 1 Both ; are weakly monotonic in x and there exist universal positive 7 This space X is de…ned after …xing the domain and range of . It will shortly be taken to be measurable. One can con…ne attention to random variables which are characterized by …nitely many parameters, so that ( ; ; v) is a …nite-dimensional vector; and then the Euclidean space generates the Borel sets. In this case the space X consists of all ( ; ; v) that satisfy (1) and (2) of Axiom1 below, along with the aforesaid …niteness restrictions on . More generally, without such restrictions, the Levy-Prokhorov metric on the random variables is understood to de…ne the Borel sets. constants c; C; d; D such that, for all x 2 E n f0g;
(Note that, on account of weak monotonicity, there is no loss of generality in supposing that all agents have the same set E of e¤ort levels. The case of an arbitrary allocation of subsets of E across agents is automatically included, provided that 0 and 1 belong to each agent's set.)
Suppose now that we have a …nite set N of agents with characteristics ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N . The principal cannot observe these characteristics, or the e¤ort levels (e n ) n2N that the agents might have undertaken; all he can see are the realizations t = (t n ) n2N of the random outputs ( n (e n )) n2N . Thus his allocation of the prize is given by a function R N + n f0g ! N where N is the unit simplex in R N ; the component n (t), of the vector (t), denotes the probability with which n 2 N is allocated the prize. We further assume that n (t) = 0 for all n 2 N if t = 0, otherwise agents would be rewarded for not participating in the game.
The principal is risk-neutral and cares only about the expected total output produced by the agents. To this end he can devise di¤erent allocation schemes . A full class of such schemes will be considered later in section 9. For the present, we focus on two particular schemes. The deterministic scheme D shares the prize equally among the winners W (t) = fk 2 N : t k = maxft n : n 2 N gg, i.e., n D (t) = 1=jW (t)j if n 2 W (t) and t 6 = 0; and is 0 if t = 0:
(Note that D is deterministic only in the outputs, not necessarily in the e¤ort levels.)
The proportional scheme P awards the prize to each agent in proportion to his output,i.e., n P (t) = t n =( P k2N t k ) if t 6 = 0; and is 0 if t = 0:
The Strategic Game of Complete Information
As was said, the principal does not know agents'characteristics, nor even the distribution of their characteristics. He wishes to compare D versus P over a large class of distributions. As for the agents, we at …rst take them to be well informed. We suppose that, in addition to knowing = D or P , the agents also know each others'characteristics ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N . This seems to be a tenable hypothesis if agents compete in close proximity with one another. (In Section 8 we consider the case when an agent knows his own characteristics but is unsure about those of his rivals.) Given ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N , a strategic game is induced among the agents by the principal's choice of an allocation scheme . The set of pure strategies of each agent n 2 N is E. Any N -tuple of pure strategies e = (e n ) n2N gives rise to a random vector t =t (e) = ( n (e n )) n2N of outputs. The expected value p k of k (t) represents the probability of k winning the prize and we de…ne k's payo¤ to be
Denote by the mixed extension of this game; and by k the set of (mixed) strategies of k in , i.e.
k is just the set of probability distributions on E. (Without confusion, F k ( ) will continue to denote k's payo¤, when the mixed strategy N -tuple
Recall that the choice 2 is called individually rational (IR) in if
for all n 2 N ; and is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of if
for all n 2 N . Denote by IR( ), N E( ) the set of all strategies that are IR, NE in the game , and note N E( ) IR( ).
Spaces of Games
Suppose characteristics ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N are picked from X X X according to some probability distribution on X. (Throughout, as was said, we assume that the underlying set X satis…es Axiom 1; and that X is a Borel space as explained in footnote 4, so that is a measure on the Borel sets of X;using the product topology from X:) Fix an allocation scheme . Then any 2 X induces a mixedstrategy game among the agents (as discussed in section 3), which we shall denote ( ). We wish to extend our solution concepts to the space of games speci…ed by . Our focus will be on what happens for almost all according to , denoted a:a: ( ), i.e., for all except perhaps for those in a set of -measure zero.
Let f : X ! be a measurable function. For each 2 X, note that f ( ) is an N -tuple of mixed strategies. Denoting f ( ) ( n ) n2N , the total output at is
and integrating over X according to , the expected total output is
Given a prize scheme we will say that f : X ! is an -NE selection under if f is measurable and if f ( ) is a Nash Equilibrium of the game ( ) for a:a: ( ). The notion of a -IR selection under is de…ned similarly.
Proportional Prize: Expected Total Output from Nash Equilibria
It is clear a priori that, for any 2 X and any scheme , the total expected output in ( ), at any 2 , cannot exceed jN jD since no agent produces more than D when he chooses maximal e¤ort 1 (see Axiom 1). Also 8 , supposing v n = v for all n 2 N , the total expected disutility incurred by the agents at any individually rational strategy selection cannot exceed v, otherwise some agent is incurring negative utility and would be better o¤ not participating in the game. But then expected total output (see, again, Axiom 1) is at most Dv=c. Thus, the most this total can be is "of the order of"min(v; jN j), since D and c are constants of our model. This is the ‡avor of our estimate in Theorem 3 below, showing that the proportional prize elicits a "decent quantum" of output from the agents. However the theorem requires an additional assumption, which we now describe. For = ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N denote v( ) = minfv n : n 2 N g and de…ne v to be the essential in…mum of v( ) with respect to .
Axiom 2 (Minimum valuation) v > DC=d
This basically says that, for any two individuals picked from the population, if both work at maximal e¤ort and are awarded the prize proportionately, then neither will have incentive to unilaterally quit the game -each values the prize su¢ ciently 8 Given = ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N , and a vector ( n ) n2N >> 0 of positive scalars, let ( ) ( n n ; n ; n v n ). Then the games ( ) and ( ( )) are "strategically equivalent" and all our solution concepts remain the same for them. So w.l.o.g., scaling utilities appropriately, one could imagine v n = v for all n 2 N .
highly to want to stay in. Indeed, by Axiom 1 the most disadvantaged such individual produces d, incurs disutility C, and values the prize at v (while his rival produces D):Thus his reward is vd=(d + D) which must exceed C:Our Axiom 2 is somewhat milder. We now show that Nash Equilibria (NE) elicit a decent quantum of output under the proportional prize.
Theorem 3 Suppose Axioms 1 and 2 hold. Denote e min minfx : x 2 E n f0gg. Let f be a -NE selection under P . Write a jN jde min and b (dv=C) D, and let H 2ab=(a + b) denote their harmonic mean. Then
where T (f ) is the expected total output as in (4) .
(The proof is in the Appendix.)
Some extensions of Theorem 3
The presence of "e min "is a dampener on our lower bound, but unavoidable given our extremely weak assumptions. Indeed there is nothing to preclude the scenario that every agent incurs sharply rising disutility of e¤ort as he advances above e min ;while his output hardly goes up; and then the best one can hope for is to inspire everyone to work at e min : Were we to strengthen our assumption on productivity, requiring output to go up in signi…cant chunks as we go up the e¤ort ladder from e min to 1, sharper estimates could be reached by the methods of this paper. (We leave this to the reader). Incidentally notice that, in the special case of binary e¤ort levels, i.e., E = f0; 1g ; we automatically have e min = 1 in Theorem 1 above, producing a sharp bound without further ado.
With this strengthened assumption, it can further be shown (see (11) ) that under the proportional prize, there are increasing thresholds such that, as the valuation of the prize exceeds these thresholds, maximal e¤ort successively becomes NE, unique NE, and "strictly dominant strategy upto error " (i.e., maximal e¤ort is the best reply of every agent provided his rivals'aggregate output is at least -the threshold obviously needing to be raised as is lowered.) In this sense, the proportional scheme permits more certainty (predictability) about agents'behavior at the cost of enhancing the prize This is not a feature of the deterministic prize.
Finally, we note that Theorem 1 remains valid if we replace NE by WNS ("Weak Nash Strategies"). WNS are de…ned just like NE, but with unilateral deviations of an agent restricted to shifting probabilities, albeit in whatever manner he desires, from his current strategy onto maximal e¤ort. (Thus, in particular, the choice of maximal e¤ort level 1 by each agent constitutes a WNS.) Since NE are clearly a subset of WNS, this generalizes Theorem 1. (For details, see again (11).) 6 Deterministic Prize: Expected Output from Individually Rational Strategies
Lemma 5 below provides the crucial insight as to why the deterministic prize D elicits limited output. Indeed it shows that only the most productive agent, along with those who stand a chance of beating him, set the bound on the output at any individually rational strategy-tuple. Fix = ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N . Denote by h an agent (the "hero") who has maximal mean output under e¤ort level 1, i.e., for all n 2 N , we have h (1) n (1) (where, recall again, n (x) is the mean of n (x)). De…ne K( ) to be the set of "elite agents" whose outputs at e¤ort 1 have a positive probability of exceeding that of h, i.e.,
We shall show that the output under deterministic prize is commensurate with jK( )j. First we need Axiom 4
(Bounded relative valuations)
There exists a universal constant B such that for a:a:
where " " denotes …rst order stochastic dominance 9 .
Lemma 5 Suppose Axioms 1 and 4 hold. Let f be a -IR-selection under D ; then for a:a: ( )
(The proof is in the Appendix.).
Estimation of the Average Size of the Elite Set jK( )j
A natural scenario is that agents' characteristics are not correlated to be similar but are su¢ ciently "diverse" (e.g., drawn i.i.d. from a large set). We shall, in fact, require this diversity only on their productivities ( n (1)) n2N under maximal e¤ort. This is embodied in Axiom 7 below. First, a de…nition: De…nition 6 (Normalized Density) .Let Z be a random variable taking values in the n-cube
We say that Z has normalized density function if is Borel-measurable, nonnegative and Pr(Z 2 A) = R A (x)d (x) for all Borel sets A C jN j ;and we de…ne the upper bound of to be the essential supremum of on C jN j :
We are ready to state Axiom 7 (Diversity of Skills)
1. There exists > 0 such that, for a:a:
2. As we vary on X according to ; the marginal distribution of the random variable 10 ( n (1)) n2N has a normalized density function with …nite upper bound : Condition 2 of this assumption rules out the possibility that ( n (1)) n2N is concentrated on the "diagonal" (z; :::; z) 2 C jN j : d 5 z 5 D of the cube C jN j . As the random variables 1 (1); ::::; N (1) go from being iid, with uniform density on [d; D] , to being concentrated on smaller and smaller neighbourhoods of the diagonal, rises from 1 to 1:In this scenario is a measure of how likely it is that the agents are similar. We should expect a threshold such that P outperforms D if < ;and D outperforms P if > :This is not to say that high is necessarily bad for P . Indeed if were high in regions of C jN j where agents are disparate (e.g.,towards the northwest or southeast corners of the square, when jN j = 2), this would only accentuate the superiority of P over D We do not follow this general line of inquiry here , wherein would be allowed to become unbounded in selective regions of C jN j , and bound only where agents are similar. Instead we consider the restricted scenario where is universally bounded on C jN j , thereby only preventing agents from being similar (or dissimilar!) with high probability.
Returning to the iid case, we can think of as the size of the random noise on output, and then the "diversity" of agents'productive skills is re ‡ected for us in how small the term = =(D d) jN j is. (Diversity in skills is dampened by the noise : Indeed suppose noise is symmetric across the two agents and let grow, keeping skills …xed. The two agents will become increasingly similar since their output will depend essentially on the identical noise term and their skills will count for little when is su¢ ciently large). Lemma 1 below shows that the average size of the elite set, is no more than 1 + jN j in the general setting of Axiom 7.
Lemma 8 Suppose the distribution satis…es Axiom 7. Then the expected size, under , of the elite set K( ) is at most 1 + jN j .
(The proof is in the Appendix.) We are ready to state the main conclusion of this section.
Theorem 9 Assume Axioms 1,4 and 7 hold. Let f be a -IR-selection on X under
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 5 and 8.
Proportional Versus Deterministic Prizes
Theorems 3 and 9 enable an immediate comparison between the (expected total) outputs elicited by NE, IR strategy selections under P ; D respectively. Fix, for example, all the parameters c; C; d; D; b; B; v of the model and suppose that Axioms 1,2,4,7 hold. There exists a threshold such that, if < , then for large enough N and v, we have
for any -NE-selection f under P , and any -IR-selection g under D :This is so because the lower bound on output given by Theorem 3 is independent of the noise , and rises with N; v ; while the upper bound given by Theorem 9 is independent of N; v and goes to 2B 2 CD=c as goes to 0. To get a better feel, it might help to consider a numerical example. Let B = C = c = d = 1; D = 2; jN j = 7, v = 30, = 0:05: Further let the set of e¤ort levels be E = f0; 1g so that e min = 1; and let the agents'skills be picked iid with uniform probability in the interval [d; D] = [1; 2] so that = 1:Thus the noise term is only 5% of the skill interval and does not dampen the diversity between the two agents.
By Theorem 3, the output is bounded below (noting a = 7; b = 28 ) by 5:6 at any NE-selection under the proportional prize. On the other hand, by Theorem 9, the output is bounded above by (2B 2 CD=c)(1 + jN j )) = 4(1 + 7(0:05)) = 5:4 at any IR-selection under the deterministic prize. Thus the proportional prize outperforms the deterministic. If the proportional prize is used then, at any NE, not only does the expected total output go up for the principal as we just saw, but each agent in N n K( ) wins the prize with much greater probability than before (at least de min =jN jD O(1=jN j) each, provided de min v( )=jN jD > Ce min , i.e., provided v( ) > CjN jD=d). Thus, provided the minimum valuation v( ) of the prize is large enough, all the agents in N nK( ), who constituted the impoverished majority under the deterministic scheme, suddenly …nd their prospects brighten when the proportional scheme is introduced and are able to become better o¤ by working hard. The elite coterie K( ), of course, loses its status : the probabilities of winning the coveted prize drops from O(1=jK( )j) to O(1=jN j) for each of its members, though they still must work so as to not lag behind the others. In short, the egalitarian distribution engendered by the proportional prize inspires all agents to work hard and considerably raises total output.
Welfare
The principal and the impoverished majority N nK( ) should both applaud when P replaces D ; indeed, the principal can count on the unconditional support of the majority when he institutes P instead of D , and need only worry about having to brook the displeasure of the tiny elite coterie K( ).
Bounded Deviation.
Suppose that, when an agent produces a fraction x of total output, he wins the prize with probability h(x), with h(0) = 0 and h(1)
Multiple Prizes.
One might wonder what happens when l jN j apriori …xed deterministic prizes are used instead of a single prize. When jN j = 2 it is evident that using two prizes is wasteful since the loser will always get the second prize for free. In general, if l << jN j, then again the proportional prize will perform better. The reason is as follows. Assume everyone works hard. De…ne l "heroes" by the top l mean outputs (as in section 7); and then de…ne the coterie K to consist of those agents whose outputs have a positive probability of overtaking the weakest hero. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 5, the maximal e¤ort in K will e¤ectively bound the total IR output, regardless of the values of the l prizes. Also, as in the previous section, the expected size of K will be small. Thus the proportional prize will outperform l deterministic prizes when l << jN j. We leave the case of general l for future work.
Interdependent Production
The discerning reader will notice that our analysis remains valid even if the random output produced by an agent is in ‡uenced by the e¤ort (possibly factored through output) of the others.Various assumptions will need to be recast (somewhat cumbersomely) but the same method of proof applies. We skip the details 7.5 More General Elite.
In our de…nition of the elite set, we need not rule out the possibility that the weakest agent can match the hero with small probability. This was done for ease of exposition.
More generally say that K( ) is an "(1 ) elite" set if the probability of any agent in N n K( ) producing output equalling or exceeding the hero's, is at most . (This probability is to be of course considered under the scenario that the agent and the hero are both at e¤ort level 1; and, in the case of interdependent production, that everyone in K( ) is also at e¤ort level 1.) Then the Lemma 5 holds, replacing c by c=(1 ) in the upper bound and so Theorem 9 , and hence also the comparison being carried out in this section, holds with the same amendment.
The Strategic Game of Incomplete Information
Our main theme, namely that P is better for the principal than D when agents' characteristics are su¢ ciently diverse, has been established under the hypothesis that agents know each others'characteristics. Now we show that the theme remains intact even when an agent knows only his own characteristics with certainty and has a probability distribution over those of his rivals. This is the standard scenario of incomplete information. Our analysis will be in terms of an illustrative binary game, and not at the level of generality of the complete information case. But precisely because we work with a structured example, we are able to accomplish a little bit more. We show that there is a threshold on the random noise, below which P outperforms D (as usual, from the principal's point-of-view!), and above which D does better. Thus our comparison of the two schemes is more "even-handed" in the context of our example. It points to the need for a more general study of the incomplete information case, and in particular the speci…cation of conditions where P outperforms D ; or vice versa.
Let E = f0; 1g and N = f1; 2g. Let n (1) = 1 and 11 v n = v > 1 for n = 1; 2; i.e., the uncertainty pertains only to the productivities 1 ; 2 . Of course, n z (0) = 0 as always, no matter what the "skill" z of agent n may be. Suppose that n z (1) is uniformly distributed on the interval [z; z + ], where is a measure of the noise on the output. Furthermore suppose that the skills of the agents n = 1; 2 are drawn independently from the intervals [a 1 ; b 1 ] and [a 2 ; b 2 ], with uniform probability (and that all this is common knowledge to the agents).
Since agent n is informed of only his own skill, a strategy for him is given by a function n : [a n ; b n ] ! [0; 1] where n (x) is the probability with which n chooses e¤ort 1 when his skill is x. For any prize allocation scheme , the game of incomplete information is then 11 If v 1 then the only NE in D or P is that both agents never work (since e¤ort 1 costs 1 which cannot be compensated by any probability of winning the prize) de…ned in the standard manner. (It depends not only on but also on the parameters v; a 1 ; b 1 ; a 2 ; b 2 ; which we suppress because they will be understood. Our focus is on = P or D which we keep track of in our notation.) First suppose ex-ante symmetry between the agents and no noise: [a 1 ; b 1 ] = [a 2 ; b 2 ] = [0; 1] (say); and = 0 Let F n ((p; 0 )jx) denote the payo¤ of n in the game , when he chooses e¤ort 1 with probability p and his skill level is x, while his rival chooses the strategy 0 . (Thus, if n's strategy is , his payo¤ in will be F n ( ; 12 in x (for …xed n; ; 0 ), since n's disutility of e¤ort stays constant at 1 while his probability of winning the prize goes up 13 . Thus n's best reply to 0 is to switch from 0 to 1 at some "threshold" skill c, which solves F n ((1; 0 )jc) = 0 i.e., denoting by c the strategy which assigs e¤ort 1 if x c and e¤ort 0 if x < c, we see that c is a best reply to 0 in the game if F n ((1; 0 )jc) = 0. We conclude that ( c ; c ) is a 14 (symmetric) NE in if 
and
When c P = 0, the right hand side of (6) is in…nity by L'Hospital's rule while at c = 1, it is 1. Since v > 1 the solution of (6) is c P < 1, hence we have ln(
Thus, for any v > 1, we deduce that c P > c D . In short, more agent-types are working at NE under P than under D and hence P elicits more expected output. Now let noise increase (from 0 to in…nity), still maintaining the ex-ante symmetry of the agents (i.e., [a n ; b n ] = [0; 1] for n = 1; 2). Arguing as before, it is evident that threshold strategies will once again constitute NE. But for large enough, the symmetry between agents will obtain even ex-post (to any desired level of accuracy) not just ex-ante, i.e., no matter what the realization of their respective skills, the two agents are nearly evenly matched since the large noise renders their skills irrelevant. In this event, corroborating our intuitition from the introduction, D will elicit more e¤ort than P . Indeed it is easy to verify (and we omit the routine algebra) that there 12 weakly in D and strictly in P 13 weakly in D and strictly in P 14 also "the", i.e., there is only one symmetric NE as the reader may easily verify.
exists an~ such that c P ( ) < c D ( ) if <~ and c P ( ) > c D ( ) if >~ ;which asserts that, unless the noise is so high as to make skills count for little P outperforms D in games of incomplete information.
Next (unless v is so small that no agent ever works in NE we implicitly eliminate such trivial NE by presuming v is high enough). Thus P always outperforms D and, as anticipated, the superiority of p becomes more pronounced as the degree of the asymmetry rises. The exact calculations for the asymmetric case emerge from the following lemma. Suppose an agent is informed that his rival's output is uniformly distributed in some interval [z; z + ] R + and that his own skill is x. Fix x and think of z; as variable. We can compute two critical values z D z D (x; ), z P z P (x; ) such that the expected payo¤ of the agent is zero in (The proof is in the Appendix.) We leave it to the reader to see how our results for the asymmetric case can be straightforwardly derived from this proposition. In fact, this proposition su¢ ces also for the analysis of games of "partial information" which lie between what we, following others, have called games of "complete" and "incomplete" information. To be concrete suppose [a n ; b n ] is partitioned into k (for simplicity, equal) subintervals [a n + i ; a n + (i + 1) ] where = (b n a n )=k and i = 0; 1; 2; :::k 1. (When k = 1 we have "incomplete" information and as k ! 1 we converge to "complete" information.) Each agent is now informed of his own exact skill and of the subinterval of [a n ; b n ] in which his rival's skill lies. This de…nes a game of partial information in the obvious way (from his initial probability distribution on [a n ; b n ], the agent can infer conditional probabilities of his rival's skill given the subinterval of [a n ; b n ] in which it lies).
We have not done the exact calculations, but it seems reasonably clear that P outperforms D for every k; not just for the two extreme points k = 1 and k = 1 that have already been checked.
Optimal Prizes with Complete Information
Consider any class of prize allocation schemes (i.e., maps R N + n f0g ! N and (0) = 0); and any set X of pre-characteristics 16 
(
n ; n ) n2N on which the disutilities of e¤ort are universally bounded from above (as in the …rst part of Axiom 1). Further assume that there exists a 2 and a positive constant such that: at every 2 X , if is in use and all agents are working at maximal e¤ort 1, and if any one of them unilaterally deviates to some e¤ort e < 1; then the deviator's probability of winning the prize goes down by at least . (In many examples, including the two about to be presented, the proportional prize D easily ful…ls the role of such a .) With this assumption, the existence of an "optimal" (or "nearly optimal") scheme in for X is automatic 17 , as will become obvious from the de…nitions below. Its structure, however, is a delicate matter and will depend heavily on and X:
The idea behind an optimal scheme in for X is that it should Nash-implement maximal e¤ort 1 (1; :::; 1) on all of X for the least value of the prize, i.e., no other scheme in can implement 1 on X with a prize of smaller value.
More precisely,for ( n ; n ) n2N ; let ( ; v) denote ( n ; n ; v) n2N : De…ne v( ; ) = inf fv 2 R + : 1 2 N E( ( ; v))g;and v( ) = supfv( ; ) :
2 Xg:Thus v( ) is the smallest value v = v 1 = :::: = v n of the prize which Nash-implements 1 uniformly over X when the scheme is used. We de…ne^ to be optimal in for X 16 In this section the symbol will be reserved for pre-characteristics, even though it is used elsewhere for characteristics. Similarly X will denote a set of pre-characteristics.There will be no confusion. 17 The extrema (in…mum, supremum) in our de…nition of an "optimal scheme" are clearly …nite, e.g., the scheme always implements maximal e¤ort for large enough v. Thus, even if the extrema are not attained but only approached, approximately optimal schemes will exist, to any degree of accuracy one may desire.
if v(^ ) v( ) for all 2 ,in other words, if v(^ ) = inf fv( ) : 2 g. (And, in the same vein, we de…ne^ to be -optimal 18 in for X if v(^ ) v( ) + for all 2 :). An obviously equivalent de…nition would be:^ is optimal if, whenever any 2 Nash-implements 1 on X , so does^ :
Our goal in this section is to construct optimal schemes for two particular pairs , X.
Let us restrict attention to the class of all allocation schemes which satisfy the following four conditions:
n (t) = 1 if t 6 = 0;and is 0 otherwise
We shall examine the binary case of two agents (i.e., N = f1; 2g) with two e¤ort levels and deterministic output. The e¤ort levels are "shirk" (e = 1=2) and "work" (e = 1), in addition of course to e¤ort level 0 for not participating in the game. So E = f0; 1=2; 1g. The disutility of e¤ort is constant across 2 X (with 19 n (1=2) = 0 and n (1) = for n = 1; 2). What varies with 2 X is the skill (productivity) of an agent. Let (e; s) denote the deterministic output of each agent when he exerts e¤ort e 2 f1=2; 1g and and is endowed with "skill"
2 here.) For brevity, denote (1=2; s) (s) and (1; s) (s). We make some natural monotonicity assumptions on and , along with a form of "decreasing (or,later, increasing ) returns to skill": 
Axiom 11 says that the percentage gain in output, by switching from shirk to work, is a weakly decreasing function of the skill s 2 [k; K]. (The case of increasing returns is entirely analogous; see Axiom 16 below.) 18 Note that optimal schemes exist for every " > 0, thanks that the fact that v( ) is clearly …nite under our assumptions. 19 We take n (1=2) = 0 for simplicity (recall that n is permitted to be weakly increasing). But our analysis remains intact if n (1) is su¢ ciently larger than n (1=2) > 0 (as can easily be checked.)
Our main result (see theorem 15 below) shows that, when Axiom 11 holds, there exists an optimal scheme which takes the form of a monotonic step function. The location of the jump points, and the sizes of the jumps, can be computed by an algorithm based on r; R;r,R ,i.e., on skill functions and restricted to the northeast boundary of the square [k; K] 2 : And, graphically speaking, this optimal scheme lies " in between" the proportional scheme ( whose graph is linear) and the deterministic scheme (whose graph has a single jump from 0 to 1 at 1=2 ).
To establish this result, …rst note that axiom 11 simpli…es the analysis considerably, on account of: Lemma 12 Assume Axiom 11 holds. Let s 2 (k; K) and t 2 (k; K), Then there exist
and either s 0 = K or t 0 = K (The proof is in the Appendix.) Lemma 12 implies that our goal -of incentivizing an agent (of skill s) to switch from shirk to work, assuming his rival (of skill t) is working -will be achieved for
in other words, we need only worry about incentivizing the agent in the following two extremal cases, corresponding to the north and east boundaries of the square [k; K] 2 : Case A His skill is s 2 [k; K] and his rival is working with skill K. Case B His skill is K and his rival is working with skill s 2
When an agent switches from shirk to work, his fractional output goes up from r(s) to R(s) in Case A,r(s) toR(s) in Case B. Denote q(s) = 1 r(s). It is clear from our assumptions that q > R > r and that R(s) = 1 R (s); R(K) =R(K) = 1=2
It will be useful to introduce one more function, which captures the simple form of 2 when there are only two agents.
De…nition 13 ( Prize function) A prize function is a weakly increasing function
The function p is said to be e¤ective at prize level v, if 1 = (1; 1) is a Nash equilibrium for any pair (s; t) 2 [0; K] [0; K] of skills of the two agents in the associated game.
(Note that our assumptions on imply that, if jN j = 2 and 2 , then there exists a prize function p such that n ( 1 ; 2 ) = p ( n = ( 1 + 2 )), for n 2 N , whenever 1 + 2 6 = 0 ,justifying our name for p). The lemma below will be handy:
Lemma 14
The prize function p is e¤ective at level v i¤ for all s 2 [0; K] we have (q (s) ), the …rst inequality becomes p (q (s)) =v p (R (s)) which proves the result.
De…ne a sequence of points 0 = x 0 ; x 1 ; : : : ; x l in [0; 1=2] by x i = R (0) for i = 1;and x i = (x i 1 ) for 1 < i l:where (x) = min (R (r 1 (x)) ; q (R 1 (x))) and l is the smallest index i for which r 1 (x i ) is unde…ned. Note that since q; R; r are all strictly increasing functions, so is , and therefore x 1 ; : : : ; x l is an increasing sequence. 
We are now ready to state and prove
Theorem 15
(i) Any e¤ective scheme has prize level 2l ; (ii) x ! p (x) is an e¤ective scheme with prize 2l :
Proof. Let p be e¤ective with prize level v. By Lemma 14 with s = 0; we get
. Then, again by Lemma 14, we get p ( (x)) p (x) + =v whenever x; (x) 2 [0; 1]. Applying this formula repeatedly we get
which proves (i). For (ii) we …rst show that, for any s, each of the two intervals [r (s) ; R (s)] and [R (s) ; q (s)] contains some "jump"point x i . Indeed if x = r (s) is in
The argument is similar for [R (s) ; q (s)] : Now by the de…nition of p it follows that p (q (s)) 1=2l p (R (s)) p (r (s)) + 1=2l, which is precisely the condition of Lemma 14 with v = 2l :
One might de…ne "increasing returns" as in Axiom 11 , substituting " s 0 > s " in place of "s 0 < s " 
With Axiom 16 in place of Axiom 11, the natural variant of Lemma 12 holds, substituting k for K.
Lemma 17 Assume Axiom 16 holds. Let s 2 (k; K) and t 2 (k; K), Then there exist
and either s 0 = k or t 0 = k.
(The proof of this is the same as the proof of Lemma 12 in the Appendix, with s ; t ; k; s 0 < s in place of s + ; t + ; K; s 0 > s respectively.) Thus the whole analysis for optimal prizes can be replicated for this dual case, focusing on the southwest boundary of the square [k; K] 2 ; in place of the northeast boundary. We omit the details.
Optimal Prizes with Small Fractional Increments
There are many contests where the exertion of e¤ort causes only a small fractional increase in output. This happens when all the contestants are very strong -experts, champions,stars -and their base levels of output ( namely, the outputs at their lowest e¤ort levels e min ) are so high that incremental output by each contestant is a small fraction of his base, even though these increments may have large observable di¤erences between them on an absolute scale, enabling us to meaningfully compare the contestants.
We model this situation, retaining for simplicity the deterministic binary scenario of the previous section. Here an agent's skill may be identi…ed with his deterministic output when he shirks. Thus we assume that an agent of skill t 2 [k; K] produces t units of output if he shirks; and (t) > t units if he works, where (t) is nondecreasing and continuous. Let = (t; x); = (t; x) denote the fractions of total output produced by an agent of skill t when he works, shirks respectively, and his rival is of skill x and working. Given a prize function , we de…ne I( ; t; x); the t-agent's incentive to work by I( ; t; x) ( . Let denote the class of all such ; and let denote the subclass of that consists of di¤erentiable functions. For any 2 , the minimum prize that will incentivize agents to work at all realizations (t; x) 2 [k; K] ; is given by V ( ) = d=m where d is the disutility of work and m = min fI( ; t; x) :
is the minimum incentive. Thus to minimize V ( ) we must maximize the minimum incentive over 2 : We shall seek a that is "continuum-optimal" in and give a heuristic argument that, in fact, it is also "nearly optimal" in : Of course the words within quotes have to still be made precise. Let us …x > 0 and de…ne (t) = (t) = [ (t) t] = : First observe that, for small enough ,
This motivates our next de…nition (restoring the notation = (t; x); and taking the domain of the prize functions to be [k=(k + K); K=(k + K)] by supposing to be in…nitesimal):
Although we have not formally veri…ed this, intuition suggests that: if V denotes the minimum prize required in to incentivize work (in the " -model" wherein the work output of the t-agent is given by t + (t) ), and if V ( ) denotes the corresponding quantity for a continuum-optimal in , then V = V ( ) converges to 1 as goes to 0: In this sense, a that is (idealistically) continuum-optimal in is (realistically) nearly optimal in for small : This motivates Theorem 19 below.
First recall
Strictly decreasing (increasing) returns to skill:
t + (t) t is strictly decreasing (increasing) in t; i.e., (t) t is strictly decreasing (increasing) in t
Theorem 19
Assume that has strictly decreasing returns to skill. There is a unique ( that does not depend on ) that is continuum-optimal in ; and it is given by:
where 1=2
x K=(k + K) ( the rest of being determined by re ‡ection around 1=2: (x) = (1 x)) and the constant B chosen to satisfy (K=(k + K)) = 1: In the case of strictly increasing returns, an entirely analogous result holds with 1=2 x k=(k + K) in place of 1=2 x K=(k + K); and (k=(k + K)) = 0 in place of (K=(k + K)) = 1:
(The proof is in the Appendix. An examination of that proof makes it clear that jumps in the prize function will raise V ( ) , justifying our decision to ignore n in the search of an optimal scheme.)
Universality of the "Log Odds" Solution
The term x=(1 x) gives the "odds" of winning for the agent who produces the fraction x of the total output (while his rival produces the fraction 1 x ), assuming that lotteries are handed out in proportion to the outputs. Thus in the upper (lower ) half of its domain, the optimal awards the prize through "log of the odds" for strictly decreasing (increasing) returns to skill, completing on the complementary half by the requirement (x) + (1 x) = 1. What is noteworthy is that, apart from the type of returns (decreasing or increasing) exhibited by , the solution is independent of the precise form of :The solution is …rst convex and then concave for strictly decreasing returns, and the other way round for strictly increasing returns , changing shape at the midpoint 1/2. In fact these two solutions are mirror images of each other if we re ‡ect around the diagonal.
Also worthy of note is the fact (easily veri…ed , and left to the reader) that, for constant returns to skill, we get the strictly increasing returns solution.
Interpretation of the Model with Small Fractional Increments
The idea of an optimal scheme here is not that it maximizes expected total output. That would be much ado about nothing, since the output of each person goes up by only % (at an extra disutility also of the order of %) when he switches from shirk to work. The emphasis instead is on maximal e¤ort without regard to the ensuing output. We have an interpretation in mind that is, quite bluntly, non-economic. Output corresponds to a "score" that measures performance of a "players" in a "game" (think of the average score assigned by di¤erent judges to each person in a diving contest). The players, who are all of star quality, are being incentivized to put in the …nal extra burst of e¤ort to perform to the best of their ability. They value the prize enormously more than the disutility incurred for the extra e¤ort (the fame of being winner, perhaps also the money that fame might bring in the future). The interest is in …nding a scheme that is optimal in the sense that it most frugally 20 creates competition and inspires maximal e¤ort, for its own sake ( for the glory of the human spirit, and the sport). The minimum value V ( ) of the prize (which implements maximal e¤ort under ) does entail signi…cant savings, even though output rises very little: the ratio V ( 0 )=V ( ) >> 1 when we compare the optimal log-odds with arbitrary 0 2 :
Now suppose (F n ) > 0 for some n. Fix 2 F n , write f ( ) = 1 ; : : : ; N , and let n unilaterally change his strategy by shifting his probability n (0) from e¤ort 0 to e¤ort 1. Since n gets the prize with probability 0 when he chooses 0, and gets it (again by Axiom 1) with probability at least d=(Y ( ) + D) d=( Y =p + D) when he chooses e¤ort 1, his gain in payo¤ is at least
(where > holds by Axiom 2). Since either (7) or (8) 
Lemma 5
Proof. Since ( n ; n ; v n ) n2N is …xed, we shall suppress it and write K K ( ). Imagine the scenario when every agent in K chooses 1. In this scenario an j = 2 K has 0 probability of winning the prize at e¤ort level 1 and hence, by the stochastic dominance condition of Axiom 4, at any e¤ort level. This de…nes certain probabilities k > 0 for k 2 K to win the prize, and it is evident that (i) P k2K k = 1 and (ii) k is independent of the mixed strategies chosen by the agents in N n K. Furthermore for k 2 K, again by stochastic dominance, the probability that k wins can only increase if any agents in K n fkg change to strategies other than 1. Hence we deduce that every agent k 2 K can guarantee himself the payo¤
k's probability of winning the prize under ), so we have
But then, putting v v 1 and observing B 1 v v n Bv for all n 2 N by part 1 of Axiom 4 , we have
So we obtain
But each n 2 N n K can guarantee a payo¤ of at least 0 by choosing e¤ort level 0, so each F n ( ) is non-negative since 2 IR ( D ( )), and thus P n2N nK F n ( ) 0. Combining the above two inequalities, we have X
Since k (1) C and n (e) ce by Axiom 1 , we get
Recalling also that n (e) De by Axiom 1, we obtain
Clearly, by our de…nition of h and Axiom 1,
(using the fact that C > c in the last inequality). The above two inequalities prove the Key Lemma.
Lemma 8
For the proof of Lemma 8, it will be useful to …rst establish some auxiliary results. First, some notation. Let C = [0; 1] n be the unit cube in R n and let 0 < " < 1 be …xed. For x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) in C we de…ne
If X is a C-valued random variable with density (x) ; we write N " for the random variable
If (x) 1 then the x i are iid with uniform density on [0; 1]. In this case we will show that N 1 " is closely related to the binomial random variable B " , which counts the number of successes in n independent trials with individual success probability ":
Proof. It su¢ ces to establish the …rst statement, since it implies that B " stochastically dominates N 1 " , which in turn implies the second statement. For the proof of the …rst statement we note that the possible values of N 1 " are 0; 1; : : : ; n 1, while those of B " are 0; 1; : : : ; n. Therefore it su¢ ces to prove that
Ignoring ties, which occur with probability 0, the event N 1 " = k is a disjoint union of n n 1 k events, corresponding to the choice of the maximum index (in n ways) and the choice of the next k indices (in n 1 k ways). By symmetry, each of these events has probability Pr (E k ), where E k is the event E k = fx 1 is largestg& fx 2 ; : : : ; x k+1 2 (x 1 "; x 1 )g & fx k+2 ; : : : ; x n 2 [0; x 1 "]g
Thus its su¢ ces to show that
Pr (E k ) = Pr (B " = k) n
Now writing q (x) = Pr (E k jx 1 = x) we have
Since x 2 ; : : : ; x n are independent and uniform on [0; 1] we get
Integrating over x, making a change of variable y = x " ; we get, as desired
Lemma 21 Suppose (x) is bounded above by a constant : Then we have
Proof. Using (9) we get E (N " ) = 
Hence there exists a maximal pair ; 0 satisfying (10), and then either s 0 = K or t 0 = K (otherwise both and 0 could be increased slightly, still maintaining (10), and contradicting the maximality of , 0 ). In view of (10), to prove (b) it su¢ ces to show that (s 0 ) (s 0 ) + (t 0 ) (s) (s) + (t) (11) which is equivalent to (t 0 ) (s 0 ) (t) (s)
as can be seen by dividing the numerator and the denominator of the LHS and RHS of (11) by (s 0 ) and (s) respectively. But a similar maneuver shows that (10) is equivalent to
And, since s 0 > s, decreasing returns (Assumption AIV) imply
From (13) and (14), we get
establishing (12) , and thereby (11) 9.6 Lemma 10
Proof. First consider D : Then z = z D implies x = z + =v, and thus the player wins if the opponent's output lies in the interval [z; z + =v]. This event has probability ( =v) = = 1=v and gives expected payo¤ v (1=v) 1 = 0: Now consider P : The expected payo¤ is 1 Z z+ z xv x + y dy 1 = xv ln x + + z x + z 1
Setting this equal to zero and solving for z we get z = exp ( =xv) 1 x = z P For the bounds on z P we note that for an opponent of skill exactly y = x (v 1) the payo¤ under P is xv x+y 1 = 0. Thus if z + < y the payo¤ at each y in [z; z + ] is 0, which implies z P y . Similarly if z > y , the payo¤s in [z; z + ] is 0, which implies z P y :
Theorem 19
Proof. First we focus on decreasing returns. Then, by Lemma 12, we need only consider the two cases below.
Case A. Agent is at t and the rival at K:Then
Case B. Agent is at K and the rival at t:Then
Since (x) = 1
(1 x) for all x; we get 0 t t + K = 0 K t + K which, in conjunction with K (t) > t (K) (decreasing returns), implies I(K; t) < I(t; K) for all t 2 [k; K] : Thus it su¢ ces to incentivize the t agent to switch from shirk to work in Case B (for all t 2 [k; K] ). Since we want to maximize the minimum incentive, we must arrange for I(K; t) = ; for some constant , and for all t 2 [k; K] :To see this, denote G(t) = t (K) (t + K) 2 and let be a solution to the di¤erential equation, with 0 (t=(t + K)) = =G(t) for all t 2 [k; K] :Suppose there is a scheme e which does not satisfy the di¤erential equation. If e 0 (t 1 =(t 1 + K) > =G(t 1 ) for some t 1 2 [k; K], then since R 0 (y)dy = R e 0 (y)dy = 1=2 ( writing y = t=(t + K); and understanding the range of integration to be from y = 1=2 to y = K=(k + K)), we see at once that there exists t 2 2 [k; K] such that e 0 (t 2 =(t 2 + K)) < =G(t 2 ):(Thus there always exists such a t 2 for e :) But then the incentive (to work) at t 2 under e ; which is given by e 0 (t 2 =(t 2 + K))G(t 2 ); is strictly less than ;which is the constant incentive under at all t 2 [k; K] : We conclude that the minimum incentive to work under e is less than that under ;establishing the superiority of over e : So an optimal scheme must satisfy the following di¤erential equation (where e C is another constant):
For x > 1=2; let x = K=(t + K) , so 1 x = t=(t + K) and t = K(1 x)=x;enabling us to rewrite our di¤erential equation:
where C is another constant and 1=2 x K=(k + K):The solution is (x) = A + B ln x 1 x where A; B are determined from the boundary conditions (1=2) = 1=2 and (K=(k+ K)) = 1:(Thus A = 1=2.) Then, in the range (k=(k + K)) x < 1=2;the value of is determined by re ‡ection around 1=2 , i.e., (x) = 1
(1 x): The analysis for strictly increasing returns is entirely analogous. Indeed, by Lemma 17 for increasing returns, we need only consider two cases:
Case C. Agent is at t and the rival at k;where I(t; k) = 0 t t + k k (t) (t + k) 2 Case D. Agent is at k and the rival at t;where I(k; t) = 0 k t + k t (k) (t + k) 2 Strictly increasing returns imply k (t) > t (k), hence I(k; t) < I(t; k) for all t 2 [k; K], from which we derive as before that 0 (x) = C=(x(1 x)) where C is another constant, x = k=(t + k) and 1=2 x k=(k + K):The solution is (x) = A 0 + B 0 ln x 1 x for 1=2 x k=(k + K) and 1
(1 x) for 1=2 < K=(k + K), where A 0 ; B 0 are determined via the boundary conditions (k=(k + K)) = 0 and (1=2) = 1=2::
